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Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective 
Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein 
Two papers recently published in this Review, the .first by Werner 
Pommerehne, Freidrich Schneider, and Peter Zweifel (1982) and· the second by 
Robert Reilly (1982), reexamined the preference reversal phenomenon. 
Preference reversals occur when individuals are presented with two gambles, 
one featuring a high probability of winning a modest sum of money (the P bet), 
the other featuring a low probability of winning a large amount of money (the 
$ bet). The typical finding is that people often choose the P bet but assign 
a larger monetary value to the$ bet. This behavior is of interest because it 
violates almost all theories of preference, including expected utility theory. 
The studies by Pommerehne et al. and by Reilly were based on an earlier 
paper appearing in this Review by David Grether and Charles Plott (1979). All 
three of the.se investigations have followed the same general design, motivated 
by a healthy skepticism of the phenomenon and a belief that, examined under 
proper conditions, it might disappear. Thus Grether and Plott took great 
pains to correct what they saw as deficiencies in the original psychological 
experiments by ourselves (Lichtenstein & Slovic., 19·71, 1973) and Harold 
Lindman (1971). Specifically, Grether and Plott used two monetary incentive 
systems to heighten motivation, substituted a different probability device for 
deciding the outcomes of the bets, controlled for income and order effects, 
,, 
and t.ested for indifference and the influence of strategic or b<1rgaining 
effects. To their surprise, preference reversals remained much in evidence, 
despite their careful attempts to create conditions that would minimize or 
eliminate them. 
\ 
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Pommerehn.e et al., not ·Satisfied with the stringency of Grether and 
Plott's controls, attemptea to increase motivation by raising the face value 
of the payoffs and creating differences in expected value between the P and$ 
bets in a pair. They, too, found a substantial propoi;tion of reversals, 
leading them to conclude: "Even when the subjects are exposed to strong 
' incentives for making motivated, rational decisions, the phenomenon of 
preference reversal does not. vanish" (p. 573). 
Reilly was also skeptical of the adequacy of Grether and Plott's controls. 
To maximize subjects' understanding of the task, he conducted his study within 
small gro~ps where questions could readily be asked of the experimenter. The 
money at risk was placed on a desk in front of the subject and the size of 
potential losses in the gambles was increased to enhance motivation. Finally, 
some subjects were shown the expected values for all gambles and were given a 
description of the expected-value concept. Al though · the rate of preference 
.reversals was somewhat lower than that observed by Grether and Plott, the 
phenomenon persisted to a substantial extent. Reilly conceded. that these 
results provided "further confirmation of preference reversal as a persistent 
behavioral phenomenon in situations where economic theory is generally 
applied" (p. 582). Nevertheless, he maintained the hope that further 
strengthening of monetary incentives and provision of additional information 
to the subjects. would I make this troublesome phenomenon disappear, thus 
salvaging preference theory: 
Should sufficiently large reductions be achievable, we might 
consider adopting the premise that individuals are likely to be' 
consistent in making decisions that matter to. them when the 
principle characteristics of the alternatives are sufficiently 
3 
. comprehended. Applied to such cases, standard preference theory 
would then require little modification. (p. 582; emphasis in 
original) 
As researchers who have studied preference reversals !3-nd related problems 
of rational choice for quite some time, we have several concerns about the 
direction this research .seems to be taking. Certainly a phenomenon such as 
preference reversals should be subjected to rigorous tests such as those 
administered by Grether and Plott, Pommerehne et al., and Reilly. These 
studies have been valuable in demonstrating the robustness of the effect. 
However, there is a substantial body of research on pref.erence reversals 
within the psychological literature that is beipg neglected here. Moreover, 
reversals can be seen not as an isolated phenomenon, but as one of a broad 
class of findings that demonstrate violations of preference models due to the 
strong dependence of choice and preference upon information processing 
considerations. In this paper we shall describe relevant psychological work 
in order to broaden the perspective on preference reversals. 
I. History 
Readers of the papers by Pommerehne et al. and Reilly would hardly know 
there was considerable. scrutiny of preference reversals prior to the 
publication by Grether and Plott. In fact, a number of studies preceded 
Grether and Plott, most of which employed multiple experiments and conditions 
designed to test the robustness of the effect. Additional studies have 
appeared subsequently. 
frequencies of reversals. 
Each of these studies has observed substantial 
The first study designed to elicit reversals was that by Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (1971). The impetus for this study was the observation by Slovic and 
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Lichtenstein (1968) that choices among pairs of gambles appeared to be 
influenced primarily by probabilities of winning and losing, whereas buying 
and selling prices were primarily determined by the dollar amounts that could 
be won or lost. When subjects found a bet attractive, their prices correlated 
predominantly with the amount to win; when they disliked a bet, their prices 
correlated primarily w.ith the amount that could be lost. . This pattern of 
correlations was explained as the result of a starting point (anchoring) ~nd 
adjustment procedure used when setting prices. Subjects setting a price on an 
attractive gamble appeared to start with the amount to win and adjust it 
downward to take into account the probability of winning and losing and the 
amount that cduid be lost. The adjustment process was relatively imprecise, 
leaving the price response greatly influenced by the starting point payoff. 
Choices, on the other hand, appeared to be governed by different rules. 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) argued that, if the information in a gamble 
is processed differently when making choices and setting prices, it should be 
possible to ,construct pairs of gambles such that people would choose one 
member of the pair but set a higher price on the other. They proceeded to 
construct a small set of pairs that clearly demonstrated this predicted 
effect. 1 Following this, a second study was conducted to examine the strength 
of the reversal effect as a function of the ch.aracteristics of the bet pairs. 
Forty-nine pairs ·of bets were constructed, all constrained by the req~irement 
that the P bet had a high probability of winning a modest amount and the$ bet 
had a low to moderate probability of winning a large amount. Despite these 
constraints, the pairs differed significantly in the degree to which they 
elicited predictable reversals. The ideal bet pair for observing reversals 
had a larger$ bet loss than a P bet loss (facilitating choice of the P bet) 
s· 
and a large $ bet win relative to the P · bet win (facilitating a higher· price 
for the $ bet). For example, the bet with the most predicted reversals was: 
P bet, 9/12 to win $1.20 and 3/12 to lose $.10; $ bet, 3/12 to win $9.20 and 
9/12 to lose $2.00. Lichtenstein and Slovic concluded this initial study by 
noting that reversals were of interest not only because they violated theories 
of rational choice, but because of the insight they revealed about the nature 
of judgment and decision processes. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) also noted that the close dependence of 
pricing responses on a gamble' s payoffs could explain a .finding that had 
puzzled Harold Lindman (1965) in his doctoral dissertation. Lindman's 
subjects gave selling_ prices for gambles and also made paired-comparison 
choices among triplets of these gambles. He noted that the prices were 
ordered almost perfectly according to the payoffs, whereas the orderings 
derived from choices were not. Lindman (1971) subsequently performed five 
studies designed .to determine whether this sort of inconsistency would be 
influenced by the number of gambles within the choice set, the possibility of 
comparing gambles directly when deciding. upon selling prices, variations in 
the way that probabilities were displayed, and variations in the amount of 
I 
prior practice or experience. Although the experience factor had some effect, 
the general results across conditions were in close agreement with those of 
Lichtenstein and Slovic. 
Problems 'of motivation and understandability were of concern right from 
the beginning of these studies. Experiment III of our original paper 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971) .allowed college student subjects to win up to 
$8, a significant amount for an hour's work in 1969. Each subject was run 
individually, with lengthy and careful instructions. Prices and choices were 
I. 
6 
obtained three · times for each pair of bets. The third time, subjects were 
reminded·what their earlier answers had been and were asked to make a careful, 
final response. The bets were actually played and subjects were paid as a 
function of their winnings. Results for these carefully trained and 
financially motivated subjects showed a substantial proportion of predicted 
reversals. Recognizing the importance of motivation and the need to test 
non-student subjects, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) went to considerable 
· effort to replicate the initial studies on the floor of a casino in downtown 
Las Vegas. There the players could set the value of their chips at $.05, 
$.10, $.25, $1, or $5. No players ever chose $1 or $5, but even for the $.10 
chips, a typical$ bet offered either a win or a loss of $8 on a single play. 
One new feature of the· design was t)le addition 'of gambles . having negative 
expected values. The experiment attracted 44 players, many of whom were 
highly educated professionals. · Reversals of preference were frequent· and 
widespread across players, even for the negative expected value gambles, for 
which strategic tendencies to overprice the bets would have worked against the 
reversal phenomenon. 
Robert Hamm ( 1979) was another researcher who tried hard to make the 
reversal phenomena disappear--and did not. His extensive study examined the 
stability of reversals over tim~, in the face of experience, practice, forced 
introspection or discussion, and advice to adopt an intuitive or analytic 
approach to the task. The order of· stimulus sets and tasks was carefully 
cqunterbalanced. Hamm found that the reversal eftect was replicated under all 
these ·conditions. Task order had no effect, nor did emphasis on analytic or 
intuitive processes. Discussion about one's decision strategies actually 
increased the tendency towards reversals, countering the hypothesis that if 
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people were given greater opportunity to think about their strategies, the 
preferep.ce reversal phenomenon would disappear. 
John Mowen and James Gentry (1980) studied preference reversals in a quite 
different context--that . of new product development. Their subjects were 
undergraduate students of marketing and consumer behavior. They also extended 
previous research by comparing individual vs. group decisions. The stimuli 
were hypothetical products, defined according to. probability of success and 
failure and the projected profits and losses associated with those proba-
bilities. Although the proportion of reversals varied with the character-
istics of the pairs, · as found by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), strong 
reversal effects were generally observed. Group judgments and decisions were 
even more prone to reversals than those of individuals. Because group 
decisions involve discussion of strategies,, this result is congruent with the 
effects of discussioµ found by Hamm. Mowen and Gentry related the anchoring 
process thought to determine pricing responses to an anecdote provided by R. 
Kerr (1979) regarding the search for oil in the Baltimore Cany_on. Kerr noted 
that oil companies .paid 1.1 billion for the privilege of drilling despite 
negative reports from oil industry geochemists. He concluded that "Company 
managers apparently bid more on the basis of how large the possible trapping 
structures were rather than on ·the basis of the odds figured by the 
geochemists" (p. 1071). · 
In sum, many of the concerns raised and examined by Grether and Plott have 
also been investigated in other studies of preference reversals. Our purpose 
in reviewing these studies is not to deny the importance of the studies by 
Grether· and Plott, Pommerehne et al., and Reilly, but rather to inform those 
interested in this topic about the larger body of results. In our opinion, 
-=----
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the most striking result of these studies is the persistence of preference 
reversals in the face of determined efforts to minimize or eliminate them. 
II. A Broader View of Preference Reversals 
The inconsistency between prices and choices for risky prospects 
represents but one of a broad set of failing~ that have been attributed to.the 
theory_ of rational choice. James March (1978, 1982) has identified five 
general problems with the theory, one of which is particularly relevant to the 
present discussion. According to March, the theory presumes two improbably 
precise guesses about the future. One is a guess about · the future conse-
quences of current actions. The other is a guess about future sentiments 
(i.e., preferences) with respect to those consequences. 
March (1978) argued that, partly as a result of' behavioral research on 
human information-processing limitations, the way that the rational theory 
deals with .the first guess has been modified to incorporate principles of what 
( 
Herbert Simon (1957) termed "bounded rationality." Thus economic theories now 
) 
place considerable emphasis on notions of search, attention, and information 
costs. Aspiration levels, incrementalism, and satisficing have been described 
as sensible in many settings. 
In contrast, March observed that although the second guess, about 
uncertain preferences, has so far had little effect in modifying normative 
theories, it poses potentially greater difficulties for these theories and 
their applications •. He argued that limited cognitive capacity affects 
information processing abput preferences just as it affects information 
processing about consequences: 
Human beings have unstable, inconsistent, incompletely 
evoked, and imprecise goals . at least in part because human 
abilities limit preference orderliness. (1978; p. 598) 
9 
March draws upon a rich and diverse array of observations to argue that, 
contrary to normative theory, preferences are neither absolute, stable., 
consistent, precise or exogenous (unaffected by the choices they control). 
The case against consistency brings us back to the topic of preference 
- reversals. Inconsistencies between prices and choices were created on the 
basis of knowledge about different rules for processing the component aspects 
or dimensions of gambles.' Since 1968, when information processing ideas began 
to be applied to risky choice, we have learned more about how perception and 
cognition determine preferences. As we have bette'r understood those 
processes, it has become relatively easy, indeed almost commonplace, to 
produce new kinds of preference reversals. In many instances, production of 
reversals has been used to validate hypotheses about information processing in 
risky choice. 
An early demonstration of the link between information processing and 
reversals was a study by Amos Tversky (1969). Tversky hypothesized that, 
where the structure of the choice set permitted, it would be simpler and more 
natural to compare alternatives dimension by dimension than to evaluate the 
combined worth of each alternative separately (across dimensions) and then 
compare these· overall evaluations. Tversky further hypothesized · that small 
differences (e.g., below some threshold of discrimination) would be· ignored, 
even for an important dimension. Tversky tested and confirmed these 
\· 
hypotheses by creating sets of gambles in which this sort of information 
processing led to systematic, predictable intransitivities. Tversky's gambles 
contained only two dimensions, probability of winning and amount to win. For 
his subjects, probability was the dominant dimension, but if the difference 
between gambles was small, then amount to win controlled the decision. Thus, 
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given the set of gambles~'~'.£,~',.!:. with probabilities of 7/24, 8/24, 9/24, 
10/24, and 11/24 to win $5.00, $4.75, $4.50, 4.25, and $4.00, respectively,~ 
tended to be chos'en over ~' ~ over _£, _£ over ~' and i over .!:_, presumably 
because the d~fference in payoffs outweighed the slight ,difference in prob-
abilities within each of these pairs. However, e was typically chosen over a 
because .qf the relatively large difference in probabilities. This general 
finding has subsequently been replicated and ext~nded by Rob Ran yard ( 1977) 
and by Lindman and James Lyons (1978). 
The intransitivities observed by Tv~rsky arose from the tendency of 
If they had made· wholistic subjects to compare gambles on each dimension. 
evaluations separately for each gamble and compared these to determ_ine their 
choices, then ·t_he ·intransitivities would not have occurred. Comparison within 
dimensions is a natural way to choose among multidimensional objects. How-
ever, information is sometimes not available for each dimension, a situation 
that can lead to reversals. Consider, for example, the task of predicting 
which of two college students, A or B, would get .the higher grade point 
average. Two test scores are available for each student, to serve as the 
basis for prediction. One score, English Skill, is available for both 
students. The other information is unique~-Quantitative Ability for Student A 
and Need for Achievement for Student B as shown below ( the means and standard 
deviations of each test are different but are known to the evaluator). 
Student A 
Need for Achievement 
English Skills 90 
Quantitative Ability 602 
Student B 
Need for Achievement 
English Skill 
Quantitative Ability 
30 
131 
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Slovic and Douglas MacPhillamy (1974) hypothesized that commonality would 
cause a dimension to·be weighted more heavily in determining a choice, because 
common i11formation is easier to use. This, in fact, occurred and led to 
systematic rev.ersals on the above problem: 75% of the subjects rating the 
students individually gave a higher grade point average to Student A. 
However, when these· same subjects were asked to make a comparative judgment, 
they selected Student B 60% of the time (40% of the subjects exhibited 
reversals). Reversals also occurred, though less frequently, when the means 
and standard deviations were the same for each test. 
A variety of different reversals, providing strong evidence against 
traditional theories of preference, have come from the work of Daniel Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). From their systematic obser-
vations of choices among risky al·ternatives, Kahneman and Tversky have deduced 
a number of general principles, some of which violate expected utility theory, 
others of which are incompatible with all existing theories of choice or 
preference. Kahneman and Tversky distinguished between two phases in the 
choice process, an early phase of editing at1d a subsequent phase of evalu-
ation. The editing phase, which they have also referred to as framing, 
consists of a preliminary analysis of the available options, their possible 
outcomes, and the contingencies or conditional probabilities relating outcomes 
' 
to acts. One fu~ction of the framing process is to organize and reformulate 
the· alternatives so as to simplify the second phase of evaluation and choice. 
Much as changes in vantage point induce alternative perspectives on a visual 
scene, the same decision problem can be subject to many alternative frames. 
Whichever frame is adopted is determined in part by the external formulation 
of the problem and in part by the standards, . habits, and personal predilec-
tions of the decision maker. 
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A key element of framing is the coding of outcomes. Kahneman and Tversky 
show t.hat, contrary to utility theory, . outcomes are typically coded as gains 
and losses, rather than as final states of wealth. These gains and losses are 
defined relative to some neutral reference point, typically, but not ·always, 
the current asset position of the decision maker. These changes are evaluated 
' I 
according to a value function, v(x), which attaches a subjective worth to each 
possible outcome of a gamble, and a nonlinear probability weighting function, 
_nJp), which expresses the subjective importance attached to the probability of 
-...;:.::, 
obtaining a particular outcome. The attractiveness of a gamble that offers a 
chance of p to obtain outcome x and a chance of q to obtain outcome y would be 
equal to (3P)v(x) + ~q)v(y). In addition to being defined on gains and 
losses relative to some psychologically meaningful (neutral) reference point, 
the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, meaning that a given 
change in one's status hurts more as a loss than it pleases as a gain. 
Another important feature is that the function is concave above that reference 
point and convex below it,. meaning, for example, that the subjective differ-
ence between gaining (or losing) $10 and $20 is greater than the difference 
between gai'ning (or losing) $110 and $120. Perhaps the most notable feature 
of the probability weighting function is the great importance attached to 
outcomes that will be received with certainty. Thus, for example, the · 
prospect of losing $50 with probability of 1.0 is more than twice as aversive 
as the prospect of losing the same amount with probability .s. 
The way a problem is framed determines both the reference point (the zero 
point) of the value function and the probabilities that are evaluated. 
and v were linear functions, preferences among options would be independent of 
. the framing of acts, outcomes, or contingencies. Because of the character-
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istic nonlinearities ofc:'.;:ian9 v, however, normatively inconsequential changes 
in the frames significantly affect preferences. This is illustrated by the 
following pair of problems, given to separate groups of respondents. 
Problem 1. Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an 
unusual disease, whi.ch is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the conse-
quences of the programs are as follows: If Program A is adopted, 200 people 
will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Which 
of the two programs would you favor? 
Problem 2. (Same cover story as Problem 1.) If Program C is adopted, 400 
people will die. If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 
nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. Which of the 
two programs would you favor? 
Although the two problems are formally identical, the preferences tend to 
be quite different. In a study of college student.s, 72% of the respondents 
chose Program A over Program B and 78% chose Program D over Program c. This 
difference can be traced to the different frames implied by the two problems. 
The "save lives" wording of the first problem implies that the value 
function's reference point is the loss of 600 lives, while the "people will 
die" wording of problem 2 suggests that the reference point is at no lives 
lost~ Thus problem 1 falls in the concave gain region of the value function 
while problem 2 is in the convex loss region. Another study, surveying 
physicians and patients regarding choice of radiation vs. surgical treatments 
for lung cancer, produced different decisions when relevant statistics were 
changed from probabilities of surviving for various lengths of time after 
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treatment to probabilities of not surviving (Barbara McNeil, Stephen Pauker, 
' 
Harold Sox & Tversky, 1982) • 
. Another example of framing effects has been prese~ted by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982). 
Problem 1. Imagine that, in addition to whatever else you have, you have 
' 
been given $200. You are now asked to choose between ·(A) a sure gain of· $50 
and (B) a 25 percent chance of winning $200 and a 75 percent chance of winning 
nothing. 
Problem 2. Imagine that, in addition to whatever you have, you have been 
given a cash gift of $400. You are now asked to choose between (C) a sure 
loss of $150 and· (D) a 75 percent chance of losing $200 and a 25 percent 
chance of losing nothing. 
Most people choose A over Band Dover C. Yet~ the options presented in 
the two problems are identical. There is no valid reason to prefer the gamble 
in one version and the sure outcome in the other. Choosing the sure gain in 
the first problem yields a total gain of $200 plus $50, or $250. Choosing the 
sure loss in the second version yields the same result through the deduction 
of $150 from $400. The choice of the gamble in either problem yields a 75 
percent chance of winning $200 and a 25 percent chance of winning $400. If 
the respondents to these problems took a comprehensive view of the conse-
quences, as is assumed by theories of rational decision, they would combine 
the bonus with the available options and evaluate the composite outcome. 
Instead they ignore the bonus and evaluate the first problem as a choice 
between gains and the second as a choice between losses. 
preferences is induced by reframing the problem. 
The reversal of 
--··=== 
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The present authors have used the framing and reference point notions to 
explain the finding that the certain loss of a stated amount of money (e.g., 
$50) was much more attractive wh~n described as an insurance premium (to 
safeguard against a .25 chance of losing $200) than when it was described as 
an alternative .to playing that same gamble (Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & 
Lichtenste.in, 1982a; see also Paul Schoemaker & Howard ·.Kunreuther, 1979, and 
John Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980, for similar results). 
III. Where Next? 
We have·presented a sample of the sorts of preference reversals that have 
informed our understanding of choice processes or have been created from that 
understanding. Those who are concerned about the possible economic implica-
tions of these phenomena have several paths to consider. One is to continue 
to subject these studies to the sorts of scrutiny that Grether and Plott and 
others have applied to the inconsistency between prices and choices. Despite 
the claims by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) that the effects they described are 
large and systematic, associated with losses of human life as well as monetary 
outcomes, not restricted to hypothetical questions, and not eliminated by 
monetary incentives, this line of research is young and there is certainly a 
need to test the limits and robustness of its findings. 
A second path is to modify utility theory in order to accommodate as many 
of the behavioral anomalies as possible without abandoning the theory 
altogether. This has been a popular direction in recent years. A number of 
theorists have proposed weakening or eliminating the substitution axiom in 
order to accommodate the Allais paradox (Maurice Allais, 1953) and certain 
other violations of the traditional model (see s. H. Chew and Kenneth 
MacCrimmon, 1979; Peter Fishburn, 1981; Robert Weber, 1982; Hector Munera and 
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Richard de Neufville, 1982; and Mark Machina, 1982). However, none of these 
revamped models can explain the framing effects described by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) or the preference' reversals among P bets and $ bets. Indeed, 
Machina acknowledged that, "to the extent.that preference reversals are found 
· to be systematic and pervasive, the behavioral model. presented here must 
either be generalized or replaced" (p. 308). 
A third path to follow, and one that we would advocate, is to accept the 
reality of preference reversals and related infol'lnation-processing phenomena 
and to explore their implications for important social and economic behaviors. 
We have begun to do this with regard to problems of societal risk management 
and programs for informing the public about risk (Slovic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1982b). Similarly, March (1978, 1982), whose critique went far 
I 
beyond information proc~ssing to encompass complex strategic and social 
motivations, ·has urged that a conception of preference that respects the 
"intelligence of ambiguity" _be incorporated into what he calls "the 
engineering of choice." He identified a number of conceptual problems that 
need to be addressed by choice theorists and optimization problems that need 
to be considered by choice engineers. 
In a narrower but nonetheless important vein, Hershey, Kunreuther, and 
Schoemaker (1982) have demonstrated biases in utility functions caused by 
information processing effects. They showed that methods for assessing 
utilities, varying in normatively inconsequential ways, produced very 
different utility functions, posing both practical and theoretical problems 
for those concerned with assessing people's risk preferences. Donald Wehrung, 
Kenneth MacCrimmon and K. Brothers (1980) obtained similar inconsistencies 
with business executives, leading them to question the use of utility theory 
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as a management tool. A more .general analysis of the difficulties of 
assessing preferences has been presented by Fischhoff, Slovic, and 
Lichtenstein (1980). Fischhoff et al. argue· that the strong effects of 
framing and information~processing considerations make elicitation methods 
major forces in shaping the expression of one's personal values. 
Robin Gregory (1982) inves.tigated a number of different approaches for 
estimating the value of non-market goods such as air and water quality, 
protection of threatened environments and species, and access to uninhabited 
views. He examined two ~easures of economic value, one based on an 
individual's willingness to pay to obtain or retain a good and the other based 
I 
on the amount of compensation demanded if it is relinquished. He found that 
both methods were subject to sizable framing and information-processing 
effects. 
Richard Thaler (1980) has drawn upon the reference point and framing 
notions of Kahneman and Tversky to explain a number of "economic illusions" 
that cause consumer behavior to deviate from the predictions of normative 
models. Included in his analysis were the overweighting of out-of-pocket 
costs relative to opportunity costs (foregone gains), the failure to ignore 
sunk costs, and the effects of psychic regret on such diverse areas as health 
care delivery decisions and vacation planning. Thomas Russell and Thaler 
(1982) argued that departures from rationality due to information-processing 
effects are unlikely to disappear in competitive markets. Kenneth Arrow 
(1982) underscored this argument by pointing out a number of failures of the 
rational model in insurance, securities, and futures markets that he feels are 
directly interpretable in terms of effects such as those linked to preference 
reversals and framing. 
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IV. Conclusion 
This· review has attempted to show how preference reversals fit into a 
larger picture of information-processing effects that, as a whole, pose. a 
collective challenge to preference theories far exceeding that from reversals 
alone. These effects seem unlikely to disappear, even under rigorous 
scrutiny. Moreover, anything less than a radical modification of traditional 
theories is unlikely to accommodate these phenomena. We urge economists not 
to resist these developments but, instead, to examine them for insights into 
the ways that decisions are made and the ways that the practice of decision· 
making can be improved. 
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Footnotes 
1. Contrary to the explanation by Reilly, the act of choosing the P bet 
but setting a higher price on the $ bet is not called a predicted reversal 
simply because "In all experiments reversal of P bets has been more frequent 
( 
than reversal of$ bets ..... (Reilly, 1982, p. 577, footnote 2). 
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